Management of encrypted data storage

ABSTRACT

A data storage management process is directed to aspects of managing encrypted data via data storage volumes in conjunction with a service provider computer network that hosts virtual machine instances. A volume can be created and configured for managing encrypted data with an encrypted version of a volume key. The volume can be attached to a virtual machine instance such that the virtual machine instance accesses the volume in a transparent fashion based on the volume key. Encrypted data specific to the volume can be copied across multiple regions of data storage each associated with distinct encrypted versions of a volume key corresponding to the volume.

This application claims the benefit of U.S. Provisional PatentApplication No. 62/001,590, entitled MANAGEMENT OF ENCRYPTED DATASTORAGE, and filed May 21, 2014, the entirety of which is incorporatedby reference herein.

BACKGROUND

Data centers of remote network computing providers may house significantnumbers of interconnected computing systems to provide computingresources to customers. Such data centers may provide network access,power, hardware resources (e.g., computing and storage), and secureinstallation facilities for hardware maintained by the data center, anorganization, or by another third party.

To facilitate increased utilization of data center resources,virtualization technologies may allow a single physical computingmachine to host one or more instances of virtual machines that appearand operate as independent computing machines to a connected computeruser. With virtualization, the single physical computing device cancreate, maintain or delete virtual machines in a dynamic manner. Inturn, users can request computing resources from a data center andutilize them in conjunction with virtual machine instances. Remotenetwork computing providers generally strive to provide such resourceswith optimum levels of availability, convenience and security. Morespecifically, users may specify security protocols, such as encryption,for data maintained by a remote network computing provider on behalf ofthe user.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The foregoing aspects and many of the attendant advantages will becomemore readily appreciated as the same become better understood byreference to the following detailed description, when taken inconjunction with the accompanying drawings. Throughout the drawings,reference numbers may be re-used to indicate correspondence betweenreferenced elements. The drawings are provided to illustrate exampleembodiments described herein and are not intended to limit the scope ofthe disclosure.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an embodiment of a networkedcomputing environment including a client computing device and a serviceprovider computer network.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating example components of a hostcomputing device utilized in accordance with the networked computingenvironment depicted in FIG. 1.

FIG. 3 is a simplified block diagram illustrating creation of a datastorage volume in the networked computing environment of FIG. 1according to one embodiment.

FIG. 4A is a simplified block diagram illustrating attachment of a datastorage volume to a virtual machine instance in the networked computingenvironment of FIG. 1 according to one embodiment.

FIG. 4B is a simplified block diagram illustrating attachment of a datastorage volume to a virtual machine instance in the networked computingenvironment of FIG. 1 according to another embodiment.

FIGS. 5A and 5B are simplified block diagrams illustrating two regionsin the networked computing environment of FIG. 1 and correspondingvolume-specific information in the two regions according to oneembodiment.

FIG. 5C is a simplified block diagram illustrating copying ofvolume-specific data from a source region to a destination region in thenetworked computing environment of FIG. 1 according to one embodiment.

FIG. 5D is a simplified block diagrams illustrating copying ofvolume-specific data from a source region to a destination region in thenetworked computing environment of FIG. 1 according to anotherembodiment.

FIG. 6 is a flow diagram of an illustrative data storage volume creationprocess.

FIG. 7 is a flow diagram of an illustrative process to attach a datastorage volume to a virtual machine instance.

FIG. 8 is a flow diagram of an illustrative process to copyvolume-specific data from a source region to a destination region.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Generally described, the present disclosure is related to management ofencrypted data with respect to data storage volumes (“volumes”),including block storage volumes and other types of volumes. Morespecifically, aspects of the present disclosure are directed tomanagement of the encrypted data stored in volumes in conjunction withone or more virtual machine instances hosted by one or more physicalcomputing devices. Illustratively, data utilized by, or created by, thevirtual machine instances is encrypted and maintained without requiringencryption key management by the virtual machine instances or theirassociated customers. Accordingly, customers of a remote network serviceprovider need only specify for the encryption of data on a volume.

One aspect of the disclosure is directed to configuration of a volume toreceive and manage encrypted data. The volume can be set up independentof the encrypted data, and accordingly can be subject to variousindependent compression, indexing, or volume encryption operations. Inone embodiment, a storage management service in a service providernetwork receives a request to create a volume for storing data in anencrypted form. The storage management service can allocate physicalspace for the volume according to information included in the request(e.g., factors corresponding to size, location, performance, or thelike) and generate related volume metadata (e.g., volume id, volumepointers or logical paths, volume interface parameters, or the like).The volume is associated with a volume key for encrypting or decryptingdata specific to the volume in which the encrypted data will be stored.For example, plaintext data associated with a virtual machine instanceattached to the volume is encrypted by a process running on the hostcomputing device according to the volume key and converted intocorresponding ciphertext, which can then be written to the physicalspace allocated for the volume. In reverse, data read directly from thevolume is in ciphertext form and will be decrypted by the processrunning on the host computing device using the volume key forutilization by the corresponding virtual machine instance.

For various security purposes, the storage management service thatmanages the volumes does not have access to the volume key used by theprocess on the host computing device to encrypt or decrypt data inaccordance with this embodiment. Rather, the storage management servicecan obtain and maintain an encrypted volume key, which is a ciphertextversion of the volume key. In some embodiments, the encrypted volume keycan be generated by a key management service based on informationspecific to a customer associated with a virtual machine instance (e.g.,a client key) and the volume metadata. In many instances, the storagemanagement service does not access the volume key in plaintext formbecause data encryption/decryption based on the volume key is notperformed by the storage management service. In some embodiments, thestorage management service may perform various other services orfunctions, such as volume-based encryption operations independent of theencrypted data that are stored in the volume.

Another aspect of the disclosure is directed to the attachment of avolume configured for managing encrypted data to a virtual machineinstance. In one embodiment, a software virtual machine managerimplemented on host computing device that hosts the virtual machineserves as a bridging component between the virtual machine instance andthe volume. Upon receipt of a request to attach the volume to thevirtual machine instance, the virtual machine manager obtains anencrypted volume key corresponding to the volume, for example, from astorage management service in charge of the volume. The software virtualmachine manager can also cause decryption of the encrypted volume key bythe key management service under applicable policy that is enforced bythe key management service.

Upon decryption of the encrypted volume key, the virtual machine managerobtains a plaintext volume key, which it can use to encrypt data thatthe virtual machine instance requests to write to the volume, and todecrypt data that the virtual machine instance requests to read from thevolume. Because the data encryption/decryption occurs within the hostcomputing device, no plaintext data will be communicated between thehost computing device and the physical storage space corresponding tothe volume. Also, the bridging functionality of the virtual machinemanager is transparent to a customer operating the virtual machineinstance such that the customer does not need to operate the virtualmachine instance differently than attaching or otherwise managing aregular volume not configured for managing encrypted data.

Still another aspect of the disclosure is directed to copying dataspecific to a volume configured for managing encrypted data, acrossregions (e.g., data centers located in different geographic areas). Inaccordance with one embodiment, data storage management of a serviceprovider network may include multiple regions each associated withdistinct key management mechanisms for associating encrypted volume keyswith volumes. Illustratively, a customer may be assigned differentclient keys or their functional equivalent in different regions. Avolume may include portions across two or more regions, and encryptedvolume keys may be generated based on client keys. Accordingly, a samevolume corresponding to a specific volume key can be associated withdifferent encrypted volume keys in different regions.

In addition, encrypted data specific to a volume can be copied or movedfrom one region to another, regardless of whether the volume is createdin the region. For example, a file containing both an encrypted volumekey corresponding to the volume and all the encrypted data currentlystored in the volume can be generated. This file can be referred to as asnapshot of the volume, from which, the volume can be recovered orrecreated in the same or a different region. Besides copying theencrypted data portion of a volume snapshot from a source region to adestination region, cross-region snapshot copy can require a mechanismfor obtaining an encrypted volume key corresponding to the destinationregion. In accordance with one embodiment, a virtual machine manager ora storage management service in the service provider computer networkobtains the source region encrypted volume key, causes decryption of thesource region encrypted volume key based on source region client key,obtains plaintext volume key, and obtains a destination region encryptedvolume key by causing encryption of the volume key based on destinationregion client key. The destination region encrypted volume key is thenmade available in the destination region. As such, the volume snapshotis copied from the source region to the destination region.

Although various aspects of the disclosure will be described with regardto illustrative examples and embodiments, one skilled in the art willappreciate that the disclosed embodiments and examples should not beconstrued as limiting.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating an embodiment of a networkedcomputing environment 100 including one or more client computing devices(“clients”) 111 in communication with a service provider computernetwork 101 through a communication network 104. The networked computingenvironment 100 may include different components, a greater or fewernumber of components, and can be structured differently. For example,there can be more than one service provider computer networks 101 sothat hosting services or data storage services can be implemented acrossthe multiple service provider computer networks 101 based, for example,on established protocols or agreements. As another example, the serviceprovider computer network 101 may include more or fewer components andsome components may communicate with one another through thecommunication network 104.

Illustratively, the client 111 can be utilized by a customer of theservice provider computer network 101, and can correspond to a widevariety of computing devices including personal computing devices,laptop computing devices, hand-held computing devices, terminalcomputing devices, mobile devices (e.g., mobile phones, tablet computingdevices, electronic book readers, etc.), wireless devices, variouselectronic devices and appliances, and the like. In an illustrativeembodiment, the client 111 includes necessary hardware and softwarecomponents for establishing communications with various components ofthe service provider computer network 101 over the communication network104, such as a wide area network or local area network. For example, theclient 111 may be equipped with networking equipment and browsersoftware applications that facilitate communications via the Internet oran intranet. The client 111 may have varied local computing resourcessuch as central processing units and architectures, memory, massstorage, graphics processing units, communication network availabilityand bandwidth, etc. In one embodiment, the client 111 may have access toor control over a virtual machine instance hosted by the serviceprovider computer network 101. The client 111 may also have access todata storage resources provided by the service provider computer network101.

With continued reference to FIG. 1, according to one illustrativeembodiment, the service provider computer network 101 may includeinterconnected components such as the service provider system manager112, a key management service 105, one or more host computing devices110, a storage management service 103 and one or more storage systems107, having a logical association of one or more data centers associatedwith one or more service providers. The service provider system manager112 may be implemented by one or more computing devices. For example,the service provider system manager 112 may be implemented by computingdevices that include one or more processors to execute one or moreinstructions, memory, and communication devices to communicate with oneor more clients 111 or other components of the service provider computernetwork 101. In some embodiments, the service provider system manager112 is implemented on one or more backend servers capable ofcommunicating over a network. In other embodiments, the service providersystem manager 112 is implemented by one or more virtual machines in ahosted computing environment. Illustratively, the service providersystem manager 112 can facilitate or accomplish client interfacing andauthentication, host computing device management, computation resourceallocation and coordination, or other relevant functionalities disclosedherein.

The key management service 105 may also be implemented by one or morecomputing devices. In some embodiments, the key management service 105is implemented on one or more computing devices capable of communicatingover a network. In other embodiments, the key management service 105 isimplemented by one or more virtual machines instances in a hostedcomputing environment. The key management service 105 may receive andrespond to electronic requests to perform cryptographic operations, suchas encryption of plaintext and decryption of ciphertext. The keymanagement service may also maintain and manage keys, for example, forclients 111 who may remotely and programmatically configure and operateresources that are physically hosted by the service provider computernetwork 101. The keys managed by the key management service 105 may besecurely managed so that clients, users and/or data services do not haveaccess to the keys of others. For example, the key management service105 may manage keys so that, for a client 111, other clients or servicesdo not have access to the client's key(s) and are unable to cause thekey management service 105 to use the client's key(s) to performcryptographic operations.

In response to a request to perform a cryptographic operation, the keymanagement service 105 may execute cryptographic operations that use themanaged keys. Illustratively, the key management service 105 can selectan appropriate key (e.g., a key managed for a client 111 associated withthe request), perform the cryptographic operation using the selectedkey, and provide one or more results of the cryptographic operation inresponse to the received request. The key management service 105 canalso produce an envelope key (e.g., a session key that is used toencrypt specific data items) and return the envelope key to the deviceor system invoking the cryptographic operations. The device or systemcan then use the envelope key to perform the cryptographic operation.

Further, the key management service 105 may facilitate configuration andmanagement of policies for accessing keys. As one example, the keymanagement service 105 may be associated with an interface module (notshown) which may enable a client 111 to view, create, update, orotherwise configure policies on keys associated with the client 111. Apolicy on a key may be information that, when processed by the keymanagement service 105, is determinative of whether the key may be usedin certain circumstances. A policy may, for instance, limit identitiesof clients, other devices and/or systems that are able to direct use ofthe key, limit times when the key can be used, limit data on which thekey can be used to perform cryptographic operations, and provide otherlimitations. The policies may provide explicit limitations (e.g., whocannot use the keys) and/or may provide explicit authorizations (e.g.,who can use the keys). Policies may also be structured to generallyprovide conditions for when keys can and cannot be used. When a requestto perform a cryptographic operation using a key is received, anypolicies on the key may be accessed and processed to determine if therequest can, according to policy, be fulfilled. In some embodiments, thekey management service 105 may provide audit records related to keyusage and related policy changes to the client 111. For example, theaudit records may include key usage details (e.g., for decryption orencryption, used by which entity, for what purpose, etc.) as well asdetailed key access policy update history. For more example details onfunctionalities of the key management service 105, see U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 13/764,963, entitled “DATA SECURITY SERVICE,” filedon Feb. 12, 2013, which is incorporated by reference herein in itsentirety.

Each host computing device 110 may be a physical computing devicehosting one or more virtual machine instances 114. The host computingdevice 110 may host a virtual machine instance 114 by executing asoftware virtual machine manager 122, such as a hypervisor, that managesthe virtual machine instance 114. The virtual machine instance 114 mayexecute an instance of an operating system and application software.

In some embodiments, host computing devices 110 may be associated withprivate network addresses, such as IP addresses, within the serviceprovider computer network 101 such that they may not be directlyaccessible by clients 111. The virtual machine instances, as facilitatedby the virtual machine manager 122 and service provider system manager112, may be associated with public network addresses that may be madeavailable by a gateway at the edge of the service provider computernetwork 101. Accordingly, the virtual machine instances 114 may bedirectly addressable by a client 111 via the public network addresses.One skilled in the relevant art will appreciate that each host computingdevice 110 would include other physical computing device resources andsoftware to execute multiple virtual machine instances or to dynamicallyinstantiate virtual machine instances. Such instantiations can be basedon a specific request, such as a request from a client 111.

The storage management service 103 can be associated with one or morestorage systems 107. The storage systems 107 may be servers used forstoring data generated or utilized by virtual machine instances orotherwise provided by clients. Illustratively, the storage managementservice 103 can logically organize and maintain data in data storagevolumes. For example, the storage management service 103 may perform orfacilitate storage space allocation, input/output operations, metadatamanagement, or other functionalities with respect to volumes.

In some embodiments, a volume may be distributed across multiple storagesystems, may be replicated for performance purposes on storage systemsin different network areas. The storage systems may be attached todifferent power sources or cooling systems, may be located in differentrooms of a datacenter or in different datacenters, or may be attached todifferent routers or network switches.

In an illustrative embodiment, host computing devices 110 or storagesystems 107 are considered to be logically grouped, regardless ofwhether the components, or portions of the components, are physicallyseparate. For example, a service provider computer network 101 maymaintain separate locations for providing the host and storagecomponents. Additionally, the host computing devices 110 can begeographically distributed in a manner to best serve variousdemographics of its users. One skilled in the relevant art willappreciate that the service provider computer network 101 can beassociated with various additional computing resources, such additionalcomputing devices for administration of content and resources, and thelike.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating example components of a hostcomputing device 110 utilized in accordance with the networked computingenvironment 100 depicted in FIG. 1. As described earlier, each hostcomputing device 110 may host one or more virtual machine instances,such as instances 114, 114′ and 114″. The virtual machine instances mayor may not be associated with a same client.

As described above, the host computing device 110 may include a virtualmachine manager 122. The virtual machine manager 122 may be softwareimplemented on the same computer as the respective instances 114, 114′or 114″. Illustratively, the virtual machine manager 122 tracks progressof the instances executed on the host computing device 110, monitors andfacilitates the input/output of data from virtual instances to datastorage devices or services, such as a storage management service 103,and communicates with other components of the service provider computernetwork 101 on various occasions (e.g., when assisting in volume keymanagement.) In some embodiments, the virtual machine manager 122 mayinclude an encryption component 124. Illustratively, the encryptioncomponent 124 may encrypt data to be written to logical volumes 202,202′ or 202″, that are attached to their respective virtual machineinstances 114, 114′ or 114″ based on corresponding volume keys availablefor use by the encryption component 124. In the reverse direction, theencryption component 124 may decrypt data read from a volume and forwardthe decrypted data to an appropriate virtual machine instance. In otherwords, the existence of encryption or decryption of data can betransparent to a virtual machine instance and its associated client.

With reference now to FIGS. 3-5D, the interaction between variouscomponents of the networked computing environment 100 of FIG. 1 will beillustrated. Specifically, FIGS. 3-5D illustrate, according to someembodiments, the interaction between various components of the networkedcomputing environment 100 for the creation of a volume, attachment of avolume to a virtual machine instance, and copying of volume-specificdata across regions. For purposes of the examples, however, theillustration has been simplified such that many of the componentsutilized to facilitate communications are not shown. One skilled in therelevant art will appreciate that such components can be utilized andthat additional or different interactions can accordingly occur withoutdeparting from the spirit and scope of the present disclosure.

FIG. 3 is a simplified block diagram illustrating creation of a datastorage volume in the networked computing environment 100 of FIG. 1according an embodiment. As depicted in FIG. 3, at (1) a client 111transmits a request to create and configure a volume for managingencrypted data to the service provider computer network 101. In someembodiments, the request to create a volume may be included in theclient's request to initialize a virtual machine instance or included inthe client's communications with the virtual machine instance.Illustratively, the request to create a volume may specify parameters orrequirements related to the volume, such as a size of storage spacerequested, encryption/decryption method or parameters, data input/outputperformance requirements, etc. The request to create the volume may alsoinclude information related to an identification or authentication ofthe client 111.

At (2), the service provider computer network 101 obtains a client keyspecific to the client 111 for purposes of facilitating obtaining anencrypted volume key corresponding to the volume. In some embodiments,the client key is only available through a component of the serviceprovider network 101, such as being maintained in a data storeaccessible only to the key management service 105. In some embodiments,the client key can be generated by another component of the servicecomputer network 101.

At (3), the service provider computer network 101 obtains volumemetadata corresponding to the volume. To achieve this, the serviceprovider computer network 101 may request the storage management service103 to communicate with associated storage systems and arrange forphysical storage space for the volume. The volume metadata may includeone or more volume identifiers, logical paths or pointers for accessingthe allocated storage space, or the like. In many embodiments, thevolume metadata may facilitate identification of the volume,encryption/decryption operations related to volume keys, or encryptedvolume keys, etc.

At (4), the service provider computer network 101 generates an encryptedvolume key corresponding to the volume based on at least a portion ofthe volume metadata and the client key or its functional equivalent. Insome embodiments, this may be achieved by an Application ProgrammingInterface (API) call between components of the service provider computernetwork 101. The API call may include an identifier to the client key orits functional equivalent, and a portion of the volume metadata, such asa volume identifier, as input parameters. The API call may also specifyan encryption method or standard. In response to the API call, anencrypted volume key corresponding to the volume is generated by acomponent of the service provider computer network 101, such as the keymanagement service 105, and transmitted to the storage managementservice 103.

At (5), the storage management service 103 stores the encrypted volumekey in one or more data stores. In some embodiments, the encryptedvolume key or volume metadata are stored separate from volume data ofthe volume. Illustratively, the encrypted volume key or volume metadatacan be stored on separate storage systems. Alternatively, the encryptedvolume key can be stored as part of volume record information in adedicated data store that can only be accessed by the storage managementservice 103. Additionally, the stored encrypted volume keys can beindexed based on volume metadata to facilitate retrieval.

At (6), the storage management service 103 establishes the volume. Insome embodiments, physical storage space is allocated on correspondingstorage system(s) and certain volume metadata information, such as avolume identifier corresponding to the volume is transmitted to theclient 111, or to a virtual machine instance associated with the client111.

FIG. 4A is a simplified block diagram illustrating attachment of anencrypted data storage volume to a virtual machine instance in thenetworked computing environment 100 of FIG. 1 according to oneembodiment. As depicted in FIG. 4A, at (1) a client 111 transmits arequest to attach a volume configured for managing encrypted data to avirtual machine instance 114 executing on a host computing device 110.In some embodiments, the request is transmitted only to a serviceprovider system manager 112. Alternatively, or in addition, the requestcan be transmitted to a virtual machine manager 122 corresponding to thehost computing device 110. In some embodiments, the request to attach avolume may be included in the client's request to initialize the virtualmachine instance 114 or included in the client's communications with thevirtual machine instance 114. Illustratively, the request to attach avolume may include volume metadata corresponding to the volume, such asa volume identifier. The request to attach the volume may also includeinformation related to an identification of the client 111 orauthentication of the request (e.g., the request may be pre-signed bythe client 111 with an electronic signature). For more example detailson authentication of a request, see U.S. patent application Ser. No.13/764,963, entitled “DATA SECURITY SERVICE,” filed on Feb. 12, 2013,which is incorporated by reference herein in its entirety.

At (2), the service provider system manager 112 requests the keymanagement service 105 to grant the host computing device 110 access toa plaintext volume key associated with the data storage volume.Illustratively, the service provider system manager 112 may transmit arequest to the key management service 105 to create or update a policyfor utilizing a client key associated with the client 111, so that thehost computing device 110 is permitted to request decryption of anencrypted volume key associated with the data storage volume by the keymanagement service 105 using the client key and that the host computingdevice 110 is also permitted to receive the plaintext volume key thatresulted from the decryption. In some embodiments, the key managementservice 105 may request or allow the client 111 to select the client keyfrom multiple keys associated with the client 111 for policy creation orupdating. In some embodiments, the client key for usage by the hostcomputing device 110 is owned by a second client. For example, theclient key owned by the second client may be associated with an existingpolicy authorizing the requesting client 111 to make policy changesrelated to the usage of the client key for purposes of volume keyencryption or decryption. In some embodiments, the policy specifies thepermission for decrypting the encrypted volume key associated with thedata storage volume based on volume metadata (e.g., a volume identifier)associated with the data storage volume. For example, the permission mayspecify that the host computing device 110 is permitted to requestdecryption of any encrypted volume key associated a volume identifier,using the client key.

It should be noted that the policy for utilizing the client key may beassociated with an expiration time or condition, and may be furthermodified or revoked. For example, when the service provider systemmanager 112 receives a request to detach the volume from the virtualmachine instance 114, the service provider system manager may revoke thepolicy for allowing the host computing device 110 to request decryptionbased on the client key. As described earlier, the client key may bemaintained by and accessible only to the key management service 105. Insome embodiments, the newly created or updated policy may permit thehost computing device 110 to retrieve the client key for purposes offacilitating decryption of the encrypted volume key and obtaining aplaintext volume key corresponding to the volume.

In some embodiments, the policy updating or creation can be facilitatedby policy tokens. For example, a policy token can be generated by thekey management service 105 so as to encode or otherwise embodyinformation related to permitted purposes or functionalitiescorresponding a respective policy. Illustratively, the key managementservice 105 may transmit at least the policy token to the serviceprovider system manger 112 in response to the system manager 112'srequest for policy creation or update. An entity possessing the tokenmay later request actions by the key management service 105 inaccordance with corresponding permitted purposes or functionalities,such as, decryption of the encrypted volume key for a specific volumeidentifier.

At (3), the service provider system manager 112 provides indication ofthe data storage volume to be attached to the virtual machine instance114 and information for access to the plaintext volume key to thevirtual machine manager 122 that manages the virtual machine instance114. For example, a volume identifier corresponding to the volume and anidentification of the virtual machine instance 114 are transmitted tothe virtual machine manager 122. Depending on one or more interfaces ofthe virtual machine manager 122, the data forwarded may need to beconverted to a different format. In the embodiments where a policy tokenor another form of authorization is obtained from the key managementservice 105 for enforcing the newly created or updated policy, thepolicy token or another form of authorization may also be forwarded fromthe service provider system manager 112 to the virtual machine manager122.

At (4), the virtual machine manager 122 requests and retrieves anencrypted volume key corresponding to the volume from a storagemanagement service 103 that manages the volume. In some embodiments, thevirtual machine manager 122 may include the volume identifier or othervolume metadata corresponding to the volume in its request to thestorage management service 103. In response to the request for encryptedvolume key, the storage management service 103 can locate the encryptedvolume key corresponding to the volume based, for example, on a searchof volume records with the volume identifier of the volume, and transmitthe encrypted volume key to the virtual machine manager 122.

At (5), the virtual machine manager 122 requests decryption of theencrypted volume key based on the client key associated with the client111 and retrieves a plaintext volume key from the key management service105. This can be accomplished by the virtual machine manager 122 makingan API call to the key management service 105. Depending on embodiments,the API call may include the encrypted volume key, the policy token, anidentifier of the client key or its functional equivalent, certainvolume metadata, a credential of the host computing device 110, anidentifier of the virtual machine instance 114, combinations of thesame, or the like, as input parameters. In some embodiments, the virtualmachine manager 122 may select a credential specific to the virtualmachine instance 114 from a plurality of credentials of the hostcomputing device 110, to be included in the API call, so as to complywith a policy enforced by the key management service 105.

Upon confirming that the API call conforms to an applicable policy(e.g., the newly created or updated policy permitting the host computingdevice 110 to obtain the decryption of the encrypted volume key), thekey management service 105 performs the requested decryption andtransmits to the virtual machine manager 122 a plaintext volume key forencrypting data to be written to the data storage volume and fordecrypting data read from the volume.

At (6), the virtual machine manager 122 stores the plaintext volume key,for example, in a key data store 126. In some embodiments, the plaintextvolume key is deleted from storage when the corresponding virtualinstance 114 that the volume attaches to is terminated. At (7), thevirtual machine manager 122 provides access to the volume to virtualinstance 114. As described earlier, the virtual machine manager 122 mayencrypt data that the virtual instance 114 is to write into the volumebased on the plaintext volume key and forward the encrypted data to thestorage management service 103 for writing to the storage spaceallocated for the volume. In the reverse direction, when requested bythe virtual machine instance 114, the virtual machine manager 122 maydecrypt data read from the volume based on the plaintext volume key andforward the decrypted data to the virtual machine instance 114. Theseoperations can be transparent to the virtual machine instance 114 inthat the virtual machine instance 114 views and transacts with thevolume the same way as it does any regular volume not configured formanaging encrypted data, for example, via the same data input/outputAPIs with the virtual machine manager 122.

FIG. 4B is a simplified block diagram illustrating attachment of anencrypted data storage volume to a virtual machine instance in thenetworked computing environment 100 of FIG. 1 according to anotherembodiment. As depicted in FIG. 4B, at (1) a client 111 transmits arequest to attach a volume configured for managing encrypted data to avirtual machine instance 114 executing on a host computing device 110.The request can be transmitted to one or more components of a serviceprovider computer network 101. In some embodiments, the request toattach a volume may be included in the client's request to initializethe virtual machine instance 114 or included in the client'scommunications with the virtual machine instance 114. Illustratively,the request to attach a volume may include certain volume metadatacorresponding to the volume, such as a volume identifier. The request toattach the volume may also include information related to anidentification or authentication of the client 111.

At (2), the service provider computer network 101 obtains a client keyspecific to the client 111 for purposes of facilitating decryption of anencrypted volume key and obtaining a plaintext volume key correspondingto the volume. In some embodiments, the client key is availableinternally within one component of the service provider computer network101, such as a key management service 105.

At (3), the host computing device 110 requests and retrieves anencrypted volume key corresponding to the volume from a storagemanagement service 103 that manages the volume. In some embodiments, thevirtual machine manager may include the volume identifier or othervolume metadata corresponding to the volume in its request to thestorage management service 103. In response to the request for encryptedvolume key, the storage management service 103 can locate the encryptedvolume key corresponding to the volume based, for example, on a searchof volume records with the volume identifier of the volume, and transmitthe encrypted volume key to the host computing device 110.

At (4), the host computing device 110 requests decryption of theencrypted volume key based on the client key or its functionalequivalent and obtains a plaintext volume key. This can be accomplishedby the host computing device 110 making an API call to another componentof the service provider computer network 101, such as the key managementservice 105. In some embodiments, the host computing device 110 obtainscredentials, policy tokens, or other authorizations to act on behalf ofthe client 111 or the virtual instance 114 when issuing the API call.The API call may include the encrypted volume key, client authorizationinformation, and certain volume metadata as input parameters. Inresponse, a plaintext volume key for encrypting data to be written tothe volume and for decrypting data read from the volume is transmittedto the host computing device 110.

At (5), the host computing device 110 stores the plaintext volume key,for example, in a volatile memory accessible only to the host computingdevice 110. In some embodiments, the plaintext volume key is deletedfrom storage when the corresponding virtual instance 114 that the volumeattaches to is terminated. At (6), the host computing device 110provides access to the volume to virtual instance 114. As describedearlier, the host computing device 110 may encrypt data that the virtualinstance 114 is to write into the volume based on the plaintext volumekey and forward the encrypted data to the storage management service 103for writing to the storage space allocated for the volume. In thereverse direction, when requested by the virtual machine instance 114,the host computing device 110 may decrypt data read from the volumebased on the plaintext volume key and forward the decrypted data to thevirtual machine instance 114. These operations can be transparent to thevirtual machine instance 114 in that the virtual machine instance 114views and transacts with the volume the same way as it does any regularvolume not configured for managing encrypted data, for example, via thesame data input/output APIs with the host computing device 110.

FIGS. 5A and 5B are simplified block diagrams illustrating two regionsin the networked computing environment 100 of FIG. 1 and correspondingvolume-specific information in the two regions according to oneembodiment.

With reference to FIG. 5A, in some embodiments, a service providercomputer network 101 may include multiple regions of storage services.For example, as depicted in FIG. 5A, a service provider computer network101 includes regions 501 and 501′, each further include their respectivekey management service 105 and 105′, and respective storage managementservice 103 in connection with storage systems 107 and storagemanagement service 103′ in connection with storage systems 107′.Illustratively, regions can be defined based on geographic areas where acorresponding data center is located, requirements or capabilitiesassociated with storage systems or corresponding management system,administrative or business policies, networking or computingrequirements or constraints, data security or privacy concerns, or thelike.

With reference to FIG. 5B, in some embodiments, a volume configured formanaging encrypted data may correspond to different encrypted volumekeys in different regions. This can occur in situations where the volumespans across multiple regions, or, when data of a volume is moved amongdifferent regions. It should be noted that the plaintext volume keycorresponding to the volume may stay the same across regions so thatdata stored in the volume are encrypted consistently and can be copiedor moved across regions without incurring additional decryption orencryption operations. For example, as depicted in FIG. 5B, a volumesnapshot 510′ stored in region 501′ includes encrypted volume data 514′(in ciphertext) and corresponding encrypted volume key 512′. Theencrypted volume key 512′ can be decrypted in region 501′ (e.g., by akey management service 105′ of region 501′) to reveal a plaintext volumekey corresponding to the volume associated with data 514′.Illustratively, copying the snapshot 510′ to region 501 (as a snapshot510) can require copying encrypted volume data 514′ to region 501 andobtaining another encrypted volume key 512 in accordance with the region501. The encrypted volume key 512 can be decrypted in region 501 (e.g.,by a key management service 105 of region 501) to reveal the sameplaintext volume key corresponding to the volume associated with data514′.

With reference to FIG. 5C, interactions among components of thenetworked computing environment 100 are illustrated in accordance withone embodiment for copying a volume snapshot 510′ from a source region501′ to a destination region 501.

As depicted in FIG. 5C, at (1) a client 111 transmits a request to copythe volume snapshot 510′, from the source region 501′ to the destinationregion 501. The request can be transmitted to a service provider systemmanager 112 associated with the destination region 501. Alternatively,or in addition, the request can be transmitted to a destination regionstorage management service 103 or a virtual machine manager 122corresponding to a host computing device 110. In some embodiments, therequest may be included in the client's request to initialize a virtualmachine instance 114 or included in the client's communications with thevirtual machine instance 114. In other embodiments, the request tomigrate volume-specific data may be generated by the virtual machineinstance 114 for various administrative, computational, or programmingreasons. Illustratively, the request to migrate volume-specific data mayinclude metadata corresponding to the volume-specific data, such as avolume identifier, data descriptions, or snapshot identificationinformation. The request may also include information related to anidentification of the client 111 or an authentication of the request.For example, the request may be electronically signed by the client 111for authentication within the destination region. The request may alsoinclude pre-authenticated information, such as a pre-signed uniformresource locator (“pre-signed URL”), provided by the client 111, whichcan be used to prove authenticity of the request for snapshot copy tothe source region.

At (2), the service provider system manager 112 requests the keymanagement service 105 of the destination region 501 to grant an entityof the source region 501′ (e.g., a storage management service 103′)usage of a destination region client key managed by the destinationregion key management service 105. Illustratively, the service providersystem manager 112 may transmit a request to the key management service105 to create or update a policy for utilizing the destination regionclient key associated with the client 111, so that the source regionstorage management service 103′ is permitted to request encryption of aplaintext volume key associated with the snapshot using the destinationregion client key managed by the key management service 105 and toreceive a destination region encrypted volume key that resulted from theencryption. As described earlier, policy tokens embodying informationcorresponding to respective policies can be employed to facilitate thepolicy updating and enforcement. For example, a policy token resultingfrom the policy creation or updating may be eventually forwarded to thesource region storage management service 103′ for its use (e.g., as aparameter in an API request to the destination region key managementservice 105). In some embodiments, the created or updated policy mayallow the source region storage management service 103 to request andretrieve the destination region client key for purposes of facilitatinggeneration of a destination region encrypted volume key 512corresponding to the volume snapshot.

At (3), the service provider system manager 112 associated with thedestination region 501 communicates with a service provider systemmanager 112′ associated with the source region 501′ and transmits afurther request for copying the snapshot from the source region 501′ tothe destination region 501. The further request may include informationpre-authenticated by the client 111 to prove to the source region theauthenticity of the requested snapshot copy. As described earlier, thepre-authenticated information may be a pre-signed request generated bythe client 111, such as a pre-signed URL. The further request may alsoinclude an identification of the snapshot, a policy token to be utilizedby the source region storage management service 103′ for requestingoperations to be performed by the destination region key managementservice 105.

In response to the further request, at (4), the source region serviceprovider system manager 112′ confirms the authenticity of the furtherrequest and provides to the storage management service 103′ indicationof the snapshot to be copied and information for accessing a plaintextvolume key associated with the volume snapshot. For example, the serviceprovider system manger 112′ may cause policy updates to the sourceregion key management service 105′ and thereby permit the storagemanagement service 103′ to request decryption of a source regionencrypted volume key associated with the volume snapshot using a sourceregion client key managed by the source region key management service105′. The service provider system manager 112′ may also obtain a policytoken corresponding to the updated policy and forward the token to thestorage management service 105′.

At (5), the storage management service 103′ requests and retrieves thesource region encrypted volume key 512′ corresponding to the snapshot510′ stored in the source region 501′. In some embodiments, the storagemanagement service 103′ can locate the encrypted volume key 512′associated with the snapshot 510′ by parsing a predetermined structureof the snapshot 510′.

At (6), the storage management service 103′ requests decryption of thesource region encrypted volume key 512′ based on the source regionclient key or its functional equivalent and retrieves the plaintextvolume key from the key management service 105′ of the source region501′. Similar to what has been described earlier with respect todecryption of encrypted volume key in accordance with FIG. 4, this canbe accomplished by the storage management service 103′ making an APIcall to the source region key management service 105′ in accordance withan applicable policy for utilizing the source region client key fordecryption of the source region encrypted volume key. For example, theAPI call may include an applicable policy token or a credential of thestorage management service 103′, the source region encrypted volume keyas well as an identification of the snapshot.

At (7), the storage management service 103′ requests encryption of theplaintext volume key based on the destination region client key or itsfunctional equivalent and retrieves a destination region encryptedvolume key 512 corresponding to the volume. Similarly, the storagemanagement service 103′ can achieve this by making an API call to thekey management service 105 of the destination region 501 in accordancewith an applicable policy for utilizing the destination region clientkey for encryption of the plain text volume key. For example, the APIcall may include an applicable policy token or a credential of thestorage management service 103′, the plaintext volume key as well as anidentification of the snapshot. In response to the API call, thedestination region key management service 105 encrypts the plaintextvolume key and transmits the resultant destination region encryptedvolume key to the storage management service 103′. At (8), the storagemanagement service 103′ causes encrypted data 514′ corresponding to thesnapshot 510′ to be copied from the source region 501′ to thedestination region 501. The storage management service 103′ alsoprovides the destination region encrypted volume key to the destinationregion 501, to be associated with the copied data 514′ and thereby forma snapshot 510 in the destination region.

FIG. 5D is a simplified block diagrams illustrating migration ofvolume-specific data 514′ from a source region 501′ to a destinationregion 501 in the networked computing environment 100 of FIG. 1according to another embodiment. The volume-specific data 514′ may ormay not be included in a volume snapshot.

As depicted in FIG. 5D, at (1) a client 111 transmits a request tomigrate volume-specific ciphertext data 514′, from the source region501′ to the destination region 501. The request can be transmitted toone or more components of a service provider computer network 101. Insome embodiments, the request to migrate volume-specific data may beincluded in the client's request to initialize the virtual machineinstance 114 or included in the client's communications with the virtualmachine instance 114. In other embodiments, the request to migratevolume-specific data may be generated by the virtual machine instance114 for various administrative, computational, or programming reasons.Illustratively, the request to migrate volume-specific data may includemetadata corresponding to the volume-specific data, such as a volumeidentifier, data descriptions, or snapshot identification information.The request may also include information related to an identification orauthentication of the client 111.

At (2), the service provider computer network 101 obtains a sourceregion client key specific to the client 111 for purposes offacilitating decryption of a source region encrypted volume key 512′corresponding to the volume-specific data 514′ and obtains a destinationregion client key specific to the client 111 for purposes offacilitating generation of a destination region encrypted volume key 512corresponding to the volume-specific data 514′. In some embodiments, thesource region and client region client keys are available or can begenerated internally within respective components of the serviceprovider computer network 101 in the two regions, such as key managementservices 105′ and 105.

At (3), the service provider computer network 101 requests a sourceregion encrypted volume key 512′ corresponding to the volume from astorage management service 103′ in the source region 501′. At (4), thestorage management service 103′ can provide the source region encryptedvolume key. In some embodiments, the storage management service 103′ canlocate the encrypted volume key 512′ corresponding to the volume based,for example, on a search of volume records with the volume identifier ofthe volume. In the case of migrating a volume snapshot, the storagemanagement service 103′ can locate the encrypted volume key 512′associated with the snapshot 510′.

At (5), the service provider computer network 101 causes decryption ofthe source region encrypted volume key 512′ based on the source regionclient key or its functional equivalent and obtains a plaintext volumekey. Similar to what has been described earlier with respect todecryption of encrypted volume key in accordance with FIGS. 4A and 4B,this can be accomplished by an API call from one component to anotherwithin the service provider computer network 101. For example, the APIcall can be directed to the key management service 105′ of the sourceregion 501′. At (6), the service provider computer network 101 causesencryption of the plaintext volume key based on the destination regionclient key or its functional equivalent and retrieves a destinationregion encrypted volume key 512 corresponding to the volume. Similarly,this can be achieved via an API call between components of the serviceprovider computer network 101. For example, the API call can be directedto the key management service 105 of the destination region 501.

At (7), the service provider computer network 101 provides thedestination region encrypted volume key to the destination region 501.The destination region encrypted volume key can be forwarded to thestorage management service 103 of the destination region. At (8), theservice provider computer network 101 causes transmission ofvolume-specific data 514′ from the source region 501′ to the destinationregion 501 by, for example, an API call to the storage managementservice 103′ in the source region 501′. At (9), the storage managementservice 103 of the destination region 501 stores the destination regionencrypted volume key. For example, the storage management service 103can store the destination region encrypted volume key 512 in its volumerecords, or, store the destination region encrypted volume key in avolume snapshot comprising the data 514′ received in the destinationregion 501.

FIG. 6 is a flow diagram of an illustrative encrypted data storagevolume creation process 600, which can be implemented by one or morecomponents of a service provider computer network 101, such as a storagemanagement service 103, a service provider system manager 112, a hostmanagement service 102, a virtual machine manager 122 of a hostcomputing device 110 or other components that can be envisioned by aperson of skill in relevant art, depending on the architectural designof the service provider computer network 101.

As depicted in FIG. 6, routine 600 starts at block 602. At block 604, arequest is received to create and configure a volume for managingencrypted data. Illustratively, the request may specify parameters orrequirements related to the volume, such as a size of storage spacerequested, encryption/decryption method or parameters, data input/outputperformance requirements, etc. The request may also include informationrelated to an identification or authentication of a client associatedwith the volume. For example, the request may indicate which client orvirtual machine instance may have access to the volume. The request mayfurther include information related to a virtual machine instance, towhich the volume can be attached. At block 606, volume metadatacorresponding to the volume is obtained. At least part of the volumemetadata can be obtained from the request itself, or can be generated orderived from the storage management service 103 or its associatedstorage systems.

At block 608, a client key or its functional equivalent is used forgeneration of an encrypted volume key corresponding to the volume. Aclient key can be a unique identifier of the client with respect to datastorage in the service provider computer network 101, which may or maynot be explicitly retrievable by the client. For example, a keymanagement service 105 can manage client keys internally and provide aset of APIs for performing client key related operations such asencryption or decryption with respect to encrypted volume keys. The keymanagement service 105 can be configured to perform client key relatedoperations in accordance with client key management policies establishedby a client who requested to create the volume. For example, the clientkey management policies can be derived from the volume access relatedinformation included in the request to create the volume. A functionalequivalent of the client key can be a form of credential orauthorization of the client, which can facilitate operations related tothe client keys. As described earlier, a functional equivalent of theclient key can be associated with an expiration time or limitations offunctionalities.

At block 610, the encrypted volume key is obtained based on volumemetadata and the client key. For example, the volume metadata and theclient key or its functional equivalent can be input of an API call tothe key management service 105, which generates the encrypted volume keybased on an encryption algorithm with a portion of the volume metadata(e.g., a volume identifier) and the client key as parameters. In someembodiments, encrypted volume keys are highly available and are uniquelymapped to a combination of the portion of the volume metadata and theclient key so that there are no duplicate encrypted volume keyscorresponding to different volumes. In some embodiments, the keymanagement service 105 can perform the client key related operations,such as generating the encrypted volume keys, based on appropriate APIcalls from another entity in accordance with an applicable policy to usethe client key. In these embodiments, the encrypted volume key can beobtained without obtaining an explicit client key.

There may exist multiple encrypted volume keys corresponding to the samevolume. The multiple encrypted volume keys which may have resulted frommultiple API calls to the key management service 105 on differentoccasions. For example, a different encrypted volume key can begenerated when re-encryption of volume keys are required under certainsecurity management policies. In this example, an existing encryptedvolume key corresponding to the volume may be decrypted, and theresulting plaintext volume key may be encrypted again to generate a newencrypted volume key, which is a different in ciphertext than theexisting encrypted volume key. This newly generated, different encryptedvolume key can then be made available to the storage management service103.

At block 612, the encrypted volume key is stored. As described earlier,in some embodiments, the encrypted volume key and/or volume metadata arestored separate from data of the volume. Illustratively, they can bestored on separate storage systems. Alternatively, the encrypted volumekey can be stored as part of volume record information in a dedicateddata store that can only be accessed by the storage management service103. The encrypted volume keys as stored can be indexed based on volumemetadata to facilitate their retrieval.

At block 614, the volume is established. In some embodiments, volumemetadata information, such as a volume identifier corresponding to thevolume is transmitted to other components of the service providercomputer network 101, such as the service provider system manager 112, avirtual machine instance 114, or to the client 111. Additionally,storage space for the volume is allocated in accordance with the volumemetadata, for example, under management of the storage managementservice 103. Routine 600 ends at block 616.

FIG. 7 is a flow diagram of an illustrative process 700 to attach anencrypted data storage volume to a virtual machine instance 114. Routine700 can be implemented by one or more components of a service providercomputer network 101, such as a virtual machine manager 122 of a hostcomputing device 110 that hosts the virtual machine instance 114, aservice provider system manager 112, a storage management service 103,or other components that can be envisioned by a person of skill inrelevant art, depending on the architectural design of the serviceprovider computer network 101.

As depicted in FIG. 7, routine 700 starts at block 702. At block 704, arequest is received to attach a volume configured for managing encrypteddata to the virtual machine instance 114. Illustratively, the request toattach the volume may include volume metadata corresponding to thevolume, such as a volume identifier. The request to attach the volumemay also include information related to an identification of a client111 associated with the virtual machine instance 114 or an authenticityof the request. The request may also include a pre-signed request by aclient for decrypting an encrypted volume key associated with thevolume.

In some embodiments, the request to attach a volume may correspond to asystem recovery event. For example, a host computing device 110 thathosts the virtual machine instance 114 may incur a power loss and may besubsequently rebooted. In this case, previously attached volumes mayneed to be automatically reattached. The host computing device 110 or avirtual machine manager 122 may determine instances that are stillexecuting on the host computing device 110 by, for example, contactingthe service provider system manager 112 or another component of theservice provider network 101. The host computing device 110 or thevirtual machine manager 122 may also obtain a list of volumes that aresupposed to be attached to each virtual machine instance hosted by thehost computing device 110, for example, by accessing a non-volatilememory associated with the host computing device 110 where suchinformation is maintained. Based on these information, appropriaterequests can be generated for re-attaching volumes to the virtualmachine instances. It should be noted that policies, if any, that areenforced by a key management service 105 for permitting the hostcomputing device 110 to request decryption of respective encryptedvolume keys corresponding to the volumes to be reattached may remainvalid after the rebooting of the host computing device 110.

At block 706, information for access to a plaintext volume keycorresponding to the volume is obtained. As previously described, theinformation may include a policy token that encodes or otherwiseembodies information corresponding to an applicable policy regarding theusage of a client key associated with the client 111. The informationmay instruct the host computing device 110 or its virtual machinemanager 122 to select a credential identifying the host computing device110, the virtual machine instance 114, or their combination in someform.

At block 708, an encrypted volume key corresponding to the volume isobtained. In some embodiments, the encrypted volume key can be obtainedby sending a request to the storage management service 103 that managesthe volume. Volume identifier or other volume metadata corresponding tothe volume can be included in this request to the storage managementservice 103. In response to the request for encrypted volume key, thestorage management service 103 can locate and provide the encryptedvolume key corresponding to the volume based, for example, on a searchof volume records with the volume identifier of the volume.

At block 710, decryption of the encrypted volume key based on the clientkey is caused to be performed. As described earlier, this can beaccomplished by making an applicable API call to the key managementservice 105, with an explicit client key, policy token, a credential ofthe host computing device or virtual machine, etc., as an inputparameter, depending on various embodiments. The applicable API call mayspecify an applicable decryption algorithm. Accordingly, the decryptioncan be achieved by the key management service 105 running the algorithmwith the encrypted volume key, the client key, and possibly otherrelevant parameters such as volume metadata, as inputs. At block 712, aplaintext volume key for data input/output between the virtual machineinstance 114 and the volume is obtained. The plaintext volume key can beprovided by the key management service 105 in response to the applicableAPI call for decryption of the encrypted volume key.

At block 714, access to the volume is provided to the virtual machineinstance 114. In some embodiments, the plaintext volume key is obtainedand stored by the virtual machine manager 122 for encrypting data beforethey are written to the volume and for decrypting data read from thevolume. In some embodiments, the plaintext volume key is stored on avolatile memory accessible to the virtual machine manager 122, so thatthe plaintext volume key does not persist on any storage space. Asdescribed earlier, the virtual machine manager 122 may encrypt data thatthe virtual instance 114 is to write into the volume based on theplaintext volume key and forward the encrypted data to the storagemanagement service 103 for writing to the storage space allocated forthe volume. In the reverse direction, when request by the virtualmachine instance 114, the virtual machine manager 122 may decrypt dataread from the volume based on the plaintext volume key and forward thedecrypted data to the virtual machine instance 114. Routine 700 ends atblock 716.

FIG. 8 is a flow diagram of an illustrative process 800 to copyvolume-specific ciphertext data 514′ from a source region 501′ to adestination region 501. Routine 800 can be implemented by one or morecomponents of a service provider computer network 101, such as a sourceregion storage management service 103, a destination region serviceprovider system manager 112′, a source region service provider systemmanager 112, or other components that can be envisioned by a person ofskill in relevant art, depending on the architectural design of theservice provider computer network 101.

As depicted in FIG. 8, routine 800 starts at block 802. At block 804, arequest is received to copy ciphertext data 514′ corresponding to avolume configured for managing encrypted data, from the source region501′ to the destination region 501. Illustratively, the request to copyvolume-specific data may include metadata corresponding to thevolume-specific data 514′, such as a volume identifier, datadescriptions, or snapshot identification information. The request mayalso include information related to an identification or authenticationof a client associated with the volume. The request may further includeinformation related to a virtual machine instance to which the volume,if established, can be attached.

At block 806, the destination region service provider system manager 112requests a key management service 105 of the destination region 501 togrant an entity of the source region 501′ (e.g., a storage managementservice 103′) usage of a destination region client key managed by thedestination region key management service 105. As describe earlier, thiscan be achieved by creating or updating a policy for utilizing adestination region client key associated with the client 111, so thatthe source region storage management service 103′ is permitted torequest encryption of a plaintext volume key associated with thesnapshot using the destination region client key managed by the keymanagement service 105 and to receive a destination region encryptedvolume key that resulted from the encryption.

At block 808, source region encrypted volume key 512′ corresponding tothe volume is obtained. As described earlier, the source regionencrypted volume key 512′ corresponding to the volume can be obtainedfrom a storage management service 103′ in the source region 501′. In thecase where the volume is established in the source region 501′, thestorage management service 103′ may locate the source region encryptedvolume key 512′ in its volume records. In the case of copying a volumesnapshot, the storage management service 103′ can locate the encryptedvolume key 512′ based on a pointer or data structure corresponding tothe snapshot 510′. There may exist multiple source region encryptedvolume keys corresponding to the same volume in accordance with thesource region 501′. The multiple encrypted volume keys which may haveresulted from multiple API calls to a source region key managementservice 105′ on different occasions. For example, a different encryptedvolume key can be generated when a volume snapshot is generated. In thisexample, an existing encrypted volume key corresponding to the volumemay be decrypted, and the resulting plaintext volume key may beencrypted again to generate a new encrypted volume key, which is adifferent in ciphertext than the existing encrypted volume key. Thisnewly generated, different encrypted volume key can then be associatedwith volume snapshot data to form the snapshot.

At block 810, plaintext volume key corresponding to the volume isobtained via decryption of the source region encrypted volume key 512′based on the source region client key or its functional equivalent. Asdescribed earlier, decryption of the source region encrypted volume key512′ based on the source region client key or its functional equivalentcan be achieved by the key management service 105′ of the source region501′. An applicable API call to the key management service 105′ inaccordance with an applicable policy for using the source region clientkey may cause the decryption, and in response, the plaintext volume keyis returned. Alternatively, if an applicable decryption algorithm isavailable, the algorithm can be executed by another component of theservice provider computer network 101 with the source region encryptedvolume key 512′, the source region client key or its functionalequivalent, and possibly other parameters such as volume metadata asinputs, in order to generated the plaintext volume key.

At block 812, destination region encrypted volume key 512 correspondingto the volume is obtained via encryption of the plaintext volume keybased on the destination region client key or its functional equivalent.As described earlier, encryption of the plaintext volume key based onthe destination region client key or its functional equivalent can beachieved by the key management service 105 of the destination region501. An applicable API call to the key management service 105 inaccordance with an applicable policy may cause the encryption, and inresponse, the destination region encrypted volume key 512 is returned.Alternatively, if an applicable encryption algorithm is available, thealgorithm can be executed by another component of the service providercomputer network 101 with the plaintext volume key, the destinationregion client key or its functional equivalent, and possibly otherparameters such as volume metadata as inputs, in order to generated thedestination region encrypted volume key 512.

At block 814, the data 514′ is caused to be transmitted to thedestination region 501. As described earlier, this can be achieved bysending a data transmission request to the source region storagemanagement service 103′ with applicable metadata corresponding to thedata 514′. The source region storage management service 103′ may or maynot delete the data 514′ from the source region 501′, depending onvarious embodiments. In these embodiments, if the data 514′ is deletedfrom the source region 501′, the source region encrypted volume key 512′may be deleted as well. In some occasions, however, the source regionencrypted volume key 512′ may be retained regardless of the logicalexistence of the data 514′ in the source region. For example, key 512′may be retained for emergency or law enforcement needs in cases wheredata recovery is warranted. At block 816, the destination regionencrypted volume key 512 is made available. In some embodiments, thedestination region encrypted volume key 512 can be provided to thedestination region storage management service 103 to enableestablishment of the volume in the destination region 501.Alternatively, or in addition, the destination region encrypted volumekey 512 can be associated with the data 514′ received in the destinationregion 501 to form a new volume snapshot 510. Routine 800 ends at block818.

While illustrative embodiments have been disclosed and discussed, oneskilled in the relevant art will appreciate that additional oralternative embodiments may be implemented within the spirit and scopeof the present invention. For example, the techniques described hereinmay be utilized, without departing from the scope of the presentinvention, to allow encrypted storage management in any number of othersoftware applications and processes, including, but not limited to,image or video editing software, database software, office productivitysoftware, 3d design software, audio and sound processing applications,etc. Additionally, although many embodiments have been indicated asillustrative, one skilled in the relevant art will appreciate that theillustrative embodiments do not need to be combined or implementedtogether. As such, some illustrative embodiments do not need to beutilized or implemented in accordance with the scope of variations tothe present disclosure.

Conditional language, such as, among others, “can,” “could,” “might,” or“may,” unless specifically stated otherwise, or otherwise understoodwithin the context as used, is generally intended to convey that certainembodiments include, while other embodiments do not include, certainfeatures, elements and/or steps. Thus, such conditional language is notgenerally intended to imply that features, elements and/or steps are inany way required for one or more embodiments or that one or moreembodiments necessarily include logic for deciding, with or without userinput or prompting, whether these features, elements and/or steps areincluded or are to be performed in any particular embodiment.

Any process descriptions, elements, or blocks in the flow diagramsdescribed herein and/or depicted in the attached figures should beunderstood as potentially representing modules, segments, or portions ofcode which include one or more executable instructions for implementingspecific logical functions or steps in the process. Alternateimplementations are included within the scope of the embodimentsdescribed herein in which elements or functions may be deleted, executedout of order from that shown or discussed, including substantiallyconcurrently or in reverse order, depending on the functionalityinvolved, as would be understood by those skilled in the art. It willfurther be appreciated that the data and/or components described abovemay be stored on a computer-readable medium and loaded into memory ofthe computing device using a drive mechanism associated with a computerreadable medium, may be stored in any number of computer executablecomponents such as a CD-ROM, DVD-ROM, or provided or obtained via anetwork interface; further, components and/or data can be included in asingle device or distributed in any other manner. Accordingly, generalpurpose computing devices may be configured to implement the processes,algorithms, and methodology of the present disclosure with theprocessing and/or execution of the various data and/or componentsdescribed above.

It should be emphasized that many variations and modifications may bemade to the above-described embodiments, the elements of which are to beunderstood as being among other acceptable examples. All suchmodifications and variations are intended to be included herein withinthe scope of this disclosure and protected by the following claims.

What is claimed is:
 1. A computer-implemented method comprising:receiving a request for copying data stored in a data storage volumefrom a source region to a destination region, wherein the data storagevolume stores data encrypted by a virtual machine manager associatedwith a virtual machine instance, according to a plaintext volume keyprovided by a key management service, the virtual machine managerexecuting on a computing device hosting the virtual machine instance;wherein the virtual machine manager is separate from the virtual machineinstance and receives the data from the virtual machine instance;wherein the data storage volume is established in the source region, thesource region comprising one or more first data storage servers, whereinthe data storage volume is associated with a source region encryptedvolume key that is generated by encrypting the plaintext volume key witha source region client master key corresponding to the virtual machineinstance, wherein the plaintext volume key, the source region encryptedvolume key, and any identifier associated with the plaintext volume keyor the source region encrypted volume key, are accessible to the virtualmachine manager and are inaccessible to the virtual machine instance,and wherein the source region client master key is associated withinformation specific to the virtual machine instance; in response to therequest, by the virtual machine manager: obtaining, from the keymanagement service, the source region encrypted volume key; causingdecryption of the source region encrypted volume key based, at least inpart, on the source region client master key corresponding to thevirtual machine instance, wherein the decryption results in theplaintext volume key; causing encryption of the plaintext volume keybased, at least in part, on a destination region client master keycorresponding to the virtual machine instance; obtaining a destinationregion encrypted volume key from the encryption of the plaintext volumekey; making the destination region encrypted volume key available in thedestination region, the destination region comprising one or more seconddata storage servers; and causing transmission of the data encrypted bythe virtual machine manager to the destination region.
 2. The method ofclaim 1 further comprising causing establishment of the data storagevolume in the destination region based, at least in part, on thedestination region encrypted volume key.
 3. The method of claim 2,wherein the establishment of the data storage volume in the destinationregion comprises: allocating storage space on the one or more seconddata storage servers for the data storage volume; storing the dataencrypted by the virtual machine manager in the allocated storage space;and associating the destination region encrypted volume key with thedata storage volume in the destination region.
 4. The method of claim 2further comprising enabling access to the data storage volume in thedestination region based, at least in part, on a decryption of thedestination region encrypted volume key.
 5. A system comprising: one ormore computers including processors and memory, the memory includinginstructions that, upon execution, cause the one or more computers to:receive a request for copying data corresponding to a data storagevolume from a source region, the source region comprising one or morefirst data storage servers, to a destination region, the destinationregion comprising one or more second data storage servers, wherein thedata storage volume maintains data in the source region encrypted by avirtual machine manager associated with a virtual machine instance,according to a plaintext volume key received from a key managementservice, the virtual machine manager executing on a computing devicehosting the virtual machine instance; wherein the virtual machinemanager is separate from the virtual machine instance, wherein the datastorage volume is associated with a source region encrypted volume keythat is generated by encrypting the plaintext volume key with a sourceregion client master key, the source region client master key beingassociated with information specific to the virtual machine instance,and wherein the plaintext volume key, the source region encrypted volumekey, and any identifier associated with the plaintext volume key or thesource region encrypted volume key, are accessible to the virtualmachine manager and are inaccessible to the virtual machine instance;and in response to the request, cause the virtual machine manager to:obtain, from the key management service, the plaintext volume key; causegeneration, at the key management service, of a destination regionencrypted volume key as an encrypted form of the plaintext volume key,the destination region encrypted volume key being associated withinformation specific to a client associated with the destination region;and make the data encrypted by the virtual machine manager available tothe destination region, wherein the data encrypted by the virtualmachine manager is associated with the destination region encryptedvolume key in the destination region.
 6. The system of claim 5, whereincausing generation of the destination region encrypted volume keyincludes causing generation of an intermediate value usable by thedestination region to generate the destination encrypted volume key. 7.The system of claim 6, wherein making the data encrypted by the virtualmachine manager available to the destination region includestransmitting the intermediate value to the destination region.
 8. Thesystem of claim 5, wherein the instructions further cause the one ormore computers to make the plaintext volume key available in thedestination region.
 9. The system of claim 8, wherein making theplaintext volume key available in the destination region is based, atleast in part, on a decryption of the destination region encryptedvolume key in the destination region.
 10. The system of claim 5, whereinthe plaintext volume key is obtained based, at least in part, on adecryption of the source region encrypted volume key in the sourceregion.
 11. The system of claim 5, wherein causing generation of thedestination region encrypted volume key comprises causing generation ofthe destination region encrypted volume key based, at least in part, onan encryption of the plaintext volume key in the destination region. 12.The system of claim 11, wherein the encryption of the plaintext volumekey is performed in response to a request for the destination regionencrypted volume key from the source region to the destination region.13. The system of claim 5, wherein the source region encrypted volumekey is generated based, at least in part, on a first customer master keyassociated with a client and a volume identifier associated with thedata storage volume.
 14. The system of claim 13, wherein theinstructions further cause the one or more computers to make theplaintext volume key available in the destination region based, at leastin part, on a change of key access policy with respect to the client.15. The system of claim 5, wherein the instructions further cause theone or more computers to cause establishment of the data storage volumein the destination region based, at least in part, on the destinationregion encrypted volume key.
 16. The system of claim 5, wherein theinstructions further cause the one or more computers to receivepre-authenticated information provided by a client associated with thedata storage volume and wherein obtaining the plaintext volume keycomprises causing decryption of the source region encrypted volume keybased, at least in part, on processing the pre-authenticatedinformation.
 17. Non-transitory physical computer storage comprisingcomputer-executable instructions that, when executed, direct a computingsystem to at least: receive, at a local region comprising one or moredata storage servers, a first request for copying data corresponding toa first data storage volume in a remote region, the remote regioncomprising one or more other data storage servers, wherein the firstdata storage volume maintains data in the remote region encrypted by avirtual machine manager associated with a virtual machine instanceassociated with the remote region, according to a plaintext volume keyreceived from a key management service, the virtual machine managerexecuting on a computing device hosting the virtual machine instanceassociated with the remote region; wherein the data encrypted by thevirtual machine manager is stored in a first ciphertext form associatedwith a remote region key in the remote region, the remote region keybeing associated with information specific to the virtual machineinstance associated with the remote region, wherein the virtual machinemanager is separate from the virtual machine instance associated withthe remote region, wherein the plaintext volume key, the remote regionkey, and any identifier associated with the plaintext volume key or theremote region key, are accessible to the virtual machine manager and areinaccessible to the virtual machine instance associated with the remoteregion, and wherein the first request includes pre-authenticatedinformation provided by the virtual machine instance associated with theremote region; and in response to the first request: generate, at thelocal region, a request to the remote region to initiate copying of thedata, wherein the request to initiate copying of the data includes thepre-authenticated information; and receive, at the local region, thedata encrypted by the virtual machine manager stored in the firstciphertext form from the remote region.
 18. The non-transitory physicalcomputer storage of claim 17, wherein the computer-executableinstructions further direct the computing system to establish a seconddata storage volume in the local region based, at least in part, on thereceived data.
 19. The non-transitory physical computer storage of claim17, wherein the computer-executable instructions further direct thecomputing system to: create a permission allowing a component in theremote region to perform encryption with respect to a master key in thelocal region; and receive a local region key encrypted under the masterkey in the local region.
 20. The non-transitory physical computerstorage of claim 17, wherein the computer-executable instructionsfurther direct the computing system to obtain a local region keyassociated with the received data.
 21. The non-transitory physicalcomputer storage of claim 20, wherein the computer-executableinstructions further direct the computing system to obtain anintermediate value usable by the local region to generate the localregion key.
 22. The non-transitory physical computer storage of claim17, wherein the data corresponding to the first data storage volume is asnapshot of the first data storage volume.